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Abstract 
 
Casey Wilson: The Europeanization of Minority Rights Policy:  the Hungarian and 
Latvian Examples 
(Under the direction of Don Searing) 
 
 The twentieth century has witnessed some of the most violent and extreme 
‘policies of elimination’ towards minorities in the region of Central and Eastern Europe.  
However, it has also witnessed two major pan-European attempts towards tolerance and 
promotion of minority rights – one being the failed interwar League of Nations system 
and the other being the contemporary post-Cold War norms of the European Union, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of 
Europe.  The purpose of this thesis is to examine this ‘europeanization’ of minority rights 
by specifically looking at its recent implementation and impact on minority rights issues 
in two Central and Eastern European countries with very different ‘minority situations’:  
Hungary and Latvia.  What are the successes and limitations?  How successful have these 
policies actually been in practice and will this positive trend last or has the leverage 
behind membership in Western institutions lost momentum now that these countries have 
become members?  These are all questions I will address.  By specifically looking at the 
case of Hungary, I will also argue that changes at the national level played an important 
role as a precondition for successful EU minority rights policy implementation.  
Alternatively, in discussing Latvia I intend to argue the opposite to be true – which is that 
in this specific case it was the requirement of EU minority rights policy adoption into 
national legislation that affected changes at the national level.   
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Introduction 
 
Following the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s, it became painfully obvious that there existed a deep ‘ideational divide’ 
between the countries of East Central Europe and those of Western Europe with regards 
to the concept of minority rights.  While most of these CEE states “consistently aimed 
towards European integration”1 to solidify their economic and political status as liberal 
democracies, they first had to reconcile Western European norms regarding the protection 
of minority rights with their own laws and standards.  Since many of these countries 
came out from behind the Iron Curtain with re-emerging ideals of nationalism strongly 
implemented in their political and social structures, the stipulation of respect for and 
protection of minorities required by documents like the EU’s Copenhagen criteria and the 
Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(just to name a few) proved somewhat difficult to adopt.  To add to that difficulty were 
the inaccuracies and imperfections that existed within the Western European minority 
rights policy itself (i.e. lack of minority rights standards within the EU; superficial 
monitoring of candidate states; more concern exists for regional stability rather than for 
actual minority protections; double standard that exists in the fact that while CEE states 
were required to adopt minority rights policy, Western European states were not, etc.).2  
                                                 
1
 David J. Galbreath, “European Integration through Democratic Conditionality:  Latvia in the Context of 
Minority Rights,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 14, no. 1 (April 2006):  69. 
 
2
 Bernd Rechel, “What Has Limited the EU’s Impact on Minority Rights in Accession Countries?” East 
European Politics & Societies 22, no. 1 (2008):  171. 
  2 
Regardless of these imperfections, however, many view the so-called ‘europeanization’ 
of minority rights through the European Union generally as a success in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.  While an irony does exist in the fact that Western 
governments insisted on imposing standards on Central and Eastern Europe in an area 
where they had adopted the least amount of consensus among themselves regarding 
minimum standards or best practices, Vachudova states that “scholars [still] widely agree 
that Western insistence eventually paid off, [and made] the treatment of ethnic minorities 
in East Central Europe (ECE) one of the most vivid cases of successful EU 
conditionality.”3 
Despite this success, however, it is important to keep in mind that the “minority” 
situations in each Central and Eastern European country differ greatly.   Even so, they 
have been forced by the acquis and the Copenhagen criteria to adopt the same standards, 
practices, and policies regarding minority rights in order to obtain EU membership.  For 
example, a country like Hungary maintains very large Hungarian minority populations 
that exist outside its borders (in countries like Slovakia and Romania to name a few), 
which greatly affect its attitudes and actions towards its own minority populations inside 
its borders.  A country like Latvia, however, contains a substantially large Russian 
minority inside its borders – a Russian “minority”, it is important to note, that before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union constituted the majority population.  Therefore, while 
Hungary faces the problem of a large Hungarian diaspora outside its borders, Latvia faces 
the problem of large Russian minorities inside its borders.  In this sense, obviously the 
                                                 
3
 Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided:  Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism 
(Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press, 2005), 145. 
  3 
national attitudes and policies in each state regarding minorities are different, but are 
subject to the same scrutiny and policies from the European level.   
The purpose of this paper will be to address this europeanization of minority 
rights by specifically looking at its implementation and impact on minority rights issues 
in these two countries – Hungary and Latvia.  Is the relative success of minority rights 
policy in the region solely attributable to the europeanization of policy on the subject?  
Or are there other factors at work?  How successful have these policies actually been in 
practice and will this positive trend last or has the leverage behind membership in 
Western institutions lost momentum now that these countries have become members?  
These are all questions I will attempt to address.  By specifically looking at the case of 
Hungary, I will also attempt to argue that changes at the national level played an 
important role as a precondition for successful EU minority rights policy implementation.  
Alternatively, in discussing Latvia I intend to argue the opposite to be true – which is that 
in this specific case it was the requirement of EU minority rights policy adoption into 
national legislation which affected changes at the national level. 
The first section of this paper will give a broad overview of minority rights as 
well as the evolution of minority rights policy throughout the twentieth century.  Why 
were the minority rights standards that existed during the inter-war period with the 
League of Nations regarded as such a monumental failure while EU standards today have 
been regarded as successes?  Why did the issue of ethnic and national minorities re-
emerge with such intensity following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War?  These are important questions to address in understanding the intelligence 
and thinking behind EU minority rights policy today. 
  4 
I will then move on to focus on the actual europeanization of this policy area and 
its strengths and weaknesses.  I will address the different ‘limitations’ to EU minority 
rights policy itself and what actual problems these limitations present.  How can the EU 
maintain its importance in the area of minority rights now that the carrot of membership 
is no longer seen as a reward?  Will the momentum of success that has been seen with 
minority rights policy implementation during the pre-accession years be stymied now that 
EU membership has been achieved? 
The third section will then move on to the case studies of Hungary and Latvia and 
the affects of EU minority rights policy implementation there.  For Hungary, I will focus 
on its role as a kin and home state and its remarkable development of minority rights 
policies from the end of the 1980s onward because of this.  I will also examine how this 
proactive record of minority rights protections helped later on when Hungary had to 
begin implementing EU norms and standards on minority rights to gain membership.  
Here I will begin to present the argument of changing national interests acting as 
preconditions for successful EU policy implementation.  With regards to Latvia I will 
show that in this case it was the requirement of EU minority rights policy implementation 
that acted as a precondition for EU integration which in turn instigated domestic change 
in Latvian politics.  I will begin by giving a very brief background of Latvia’s history 
with the Soviet Union, and how Latvia’s road towards European integration “has been 
significantly affected by the legacies of its Soviet past – [mainly the legacy of its] 
considerable minority communities.”4  Significant focus will be put on Latvia’s pursuit of 
ethnic democracy rather than liberal democracy following the end of the Cold War, and 
                                                 
4
 Galbreath, “European Integration through Democratic Conditionality:  Latvia in the Context of Minority 
Rights,” 69. 
  5 
the passage of the controversial citizenship law in 1994.  I will specifically look at how 
this law serves as an example of the type of nationalistic legislation and policies that were 
being passed, how it and policies like it were impeding Latvia’s road towards becoming a 
member of the EU, and what changes were made to satisfy EU policy norms. 
  
 
 
 
The Legacy of Minority Rights 
 
What is a minority?  This term is not altogether as easy to define as one might 
think, but must be addressed in order to completely understand the issue of minority 
rights.  Can a minority population be determined in terms of numbers with the idea being 
“that an inferior numeric status presupposes an inferior political status?”5  Considering 
that sometimes it is the majority population that is discriminated against by the smaller 
population, this method of defining the term ‘minority’ is not always correct.  Preece 
maintains that when defining the ‘minority’ population it is ultimately not size that 
matters but belonging: 
Minorities are those who are denied or prevented from enjoying the full rights of 
membership within a political community because their religion, peace, language, 
or ethnicity differs from that of the official public identity.6 
 
She goes on to add that “minorities are often described as being ‘non-dominant’, that is, 
not in a position of control or authority within a political community.”7  Therefore, in 
general a minority can be described as a non-dominant group that does not enjoy full 
political participation or representation within a political community (i.e. state).  To 
further compound upon this definition we can branch out and discuss the differences 
between the different categories of minorities – i.e. national and ethnic minorities.  Tom 
Gallagher presents adequate definition for both of these categories defining national 
                                                 
5
 Jennifer Jackson Preece, Minority Rights, (Cambridge and Malden, MA:  Polity Press, 2005), 10. 
 
6
 Ibid, 10. 
 
7
 Ibid., 10 
  7 
minorities “as groupings which, to differing extents, possess a national consciousness, but 
find themselves dominated by the political agenda of a larger grouping” and ethnic 
minorities as groups who “do not possess a distinct national outlook of their own, but 
their culture and customs might place them apart from other groups in society, thus 
strengthening their identity.”8 
 
- Pre World War I - 
The issue of minorities in Central and Eastern Europe emerged alongside the rise 
of nationalism that was inspired by the French Revolution in the late 18th century: 
The idea that a community that felt itself to be a nation was entitled to have a state 
of its own was attractive to ambitious groups outside the ruling elite [who] sought 
to convince the peasant masses that they should replace a purely local or religious 
identity with a national one and be prepared to support the break-up of the 
dynastic empires.9 
 
This led to a number of territorial conflicts starting in the early 1800s with differing 
ethnic and national groups vying for control of territory that each claimed belonged to 
them because they had been there first or they had “already created a viable state in some 
earlier period before alien rule was imposed.”10  This territorial conflict culminated in the 
violence of World War I, which led to the break-up of the dominant European empires 
and ultimately “swept the last remnants of the old dynastic European order away.”11 
 
                                                 
8
 Tom Gallagher, “Minorities in Central and South-Eastern Europe” Europa Regional Surveys of the 
World-Central and South-Eastern Europe 2008, 8th edition (London & New York:  Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2007):  11. 
 
9
 Ibid, 11. 
 
10
 Ibid., 11 
 
11
 Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-States System, (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1998):  59. 
  8 
 
 
- Interwar Period - 
In the aftermath of World War I, the dominant empires that had ruled over East 
and Central Europe for so long (i.e. the German, Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian 
empires) were erased and replaced by “a dozen new or restored or enlarged would-be 
nation-states, all of which based their asserted legitimation on the then reigning politico-
moral principle of national self-determination.”12  This new concept of ‘national self-
determination’ was identified by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson “as the new organizing 
concept for a Central and South-Eastern Europe shorn of multinational empires.”13  With 
the emergence of these new nation-states came the emergence of the issue of minority 
rights. 
Under the multinational empires that existed before World War I, ethnic minority 
groups tended to fare better due to the fact that power rested with the central bureaucrats, 
and all groups living under the rule of the empire were “equally powerless, and hence 
incapable of coercing or persecuting their neighbors.”14  It is also important to keep in 
mind, however, that the territorial conflicts that had begun almost a century before with 
the state-building programs of the newly defined national groups had created many deep 
insecurities and suspicions among the different ethnic and national groups: 
 
                                                 
12
 Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, Return to Diversity:  A Political History of East Central 
Europe Since World War II, (New York and Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 1. 
 
13
 Gallagher, “Minorities in Central and South-Eastern Europe,”11. 
 
14
 Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1997), 53.  
  9 
The violent collapse of dynastic empires and the tendency of nation-building 
efforts by successor states to be subverted by invasion, war, and revolution 
created deep insecurity from 1918 [onward].  As a result, few ascendant peoples 
were inclined voluntarily to share power with minorities.  The transient nature of 
boundaries and states increased the predisposition of nationalist elites to impose 
cultural uniformity when they gained control of territories regarded as part of their 
natural homelands.15 
 
Thus, with the rise of the independent nation-state in East and Central Europe 
immediately following the First World War, power shifted to the dominant “nation” 
leaving the minority group(s) perpetually disadvantaged “in terms of political, economic, 
cultural, and sometimes even civil and legal deprivations.”16  This perpetual subjugation 
of the minority by the majority – whether intentional or unintentional, direct or indirect – 
leads to extreme ethno-national tensions and hinders the development of the whole state 
politically, socially, and economically.  A vicious cycle then emerges with the dominant 
nationalist political parties exploiting ethnic tensions “in order to obscure social and 
economic weaknesses”17, thus exacerbating hostilities among the majority group and 
further alienating the minority group(s).  While some groups are able to seek out support 
from their “ethnic and cultural ‘mother country’” (thereby internationalizing the issue), 
others without a home state of their own seek relief by retreating even further into their 
own cultural group, in effect deepening the ethnic cleavages between the majority group 
and themselves. 
In the area of East Central Europe this issue of “majority versus minority” has 
long been one with two paths to follow – that of tolerance or that of elimination.  Walzer 
states that “when subjection isn’t an experience shared equally by all the incorporated 
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 Ibid, 11. 
 
16
 Rothschild and Wingfield, Return to Diversity, 8.  
 
17
 Ibid, 10. 
  10 
groups, toleration among them is less likely,”18 which presents an adequate explanation 
for why historically the most common path for dealing with minority groups has been one 
of elimination.  This process of elimination can be pursued through the adoption of 
policies “ranging from non-violent assimilation to outright extermination.”19  However, 
while the twentieth century has witnessed some of the most violent and extreme ‘policies 
of elimination’ in East and Central Europe, it has also witnessed two major pan-European 
attempts towards tolerance and promotion of minority rights – one being the interwar 
League of Nations system and the other being the contemporary post-Cold War norms of 
the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
and the Council of Europe. 
It is important at this point to briefly examine the dynamics of the League system 
and the reasons behind its ultimate failure.  First of all, the interwar League system 
“accorded extensive rights to national minorities [mainly] to keep them from either 
seeking their own state or joining up with a revisionist ‘mother’ state.”20  There was no 
genuine concern regarding the rights of national minorities.  It is also important to note 
that the older discourse of the League “on minorities was not articulated in the language 
of ‘rights’ but that of ‘guarantees’.”21  Preece explains the importance of the semantics 
behind the verbiage: 
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 Walzer, On Toleration, 53. 
 
19
 Libor Stepanek, “Minorities in Europe – the Divergence of Law and Policy,” eumap.org, 
http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2002/jan02/minorities (accessed March 10, 2008). 
 
20
 Lynn M. Tesser, “The Geopolitics of Tolerance:  Minority Rights under EU Expansion in East-Central 
Europe,” East European Politics & Societies 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003):  483. 
 
21
 Preece, Minority Rights, 13. 
  11 
‘Minority guarantees’ were state obligations either voluntarily assumed as a 
gesture of good-will towards a particular group or state (usually kin-states of the 
minority in question) or externally imposed upon new or weak states by the great 
powers in the interests of international peace and stability.  Such arrangements 
were primarily intended to preserve the territorial integrity of existing states and 
not to satisfy the moral claims or grievances of minorities per se.  Accordingly, 
these ‘minority guarantees’ were relatively easy to repudiate when it was in the 
state’s interest to do so.”22 
 
Preece goes on to say that these so-called guarantees gave priority “to the state […] rather 
than the minority individual or group,” thereby leaving the power over the protection of 
minorities within the state’s hands as opposed to the actual minority group.23  The 
semantics of the ‘minority guarantees’ further exhibit how policy for the protection of 
minorities under the League system mainly worked to uphold the international order and 
maintain good relations between states rather than as a way to actually safeguard 
minorities.  By the 1930s the League system began to lose “its credibility once its 
sponsors appeared reluctant to invest the necessary energy in the development of a 
minority-protection framework.”24  The ultimate failure of the League treaties and the 
ease with which Nazi Germany manipulated this system to achieve its revisionist and 
irredentist goals led to a shift of emphasis after World War II from collective minority 
rights to individual-based human rights among Western European states. 
 
- Post-World War II / Cold War era -  
 It is important to understand this difference in ‘collective’ rights versus 
‘individual’ rights.  While “individual rights are designed to preserve and protect the 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, 14. 
 
23
 Ibid, 14. 
 
24
 Gallagher, “Minorities in Central and South-Eastern Europe,” 12. 
  12 
autonomy of persons as individuals[,] group rights are designed to preserve and protect 
the individual’s propensity for communal attachments and associations.”25  The shift 
from collective rights to individual human rights in Western Europe was born out of the 
horrors of the war as well as the overwhelming failure of the League system to prevent it: 
There was a fear that any codification of minority rights would be a source of 
continued instability as minorities asserted collective rights, particularly with the 
encouragement of “mother states.”26 
 
In response to these fears, immediately following the war there was a strong push to 
disassociate any rights with the concept of identity (be it national, ethnic, religious, etc.) 
as well as to strengthen “norms of noninterference by one state into another’s minority 
policy.”27  The wide adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
simultaneous establishment of the United Nations reflected these new aims with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights “subsum[ing] minority rights under a doctrine of 
individual human rights” and the United Nations assuming “the primary responsibility for 
addressing violations.”28 
In Eastern Europe, however, the situation was very different.  While communist 
ideals maintained that ethno-national conflicts would be eradicated by uniting the people 
under the banner of Communism, in all actuality “its refusal to recognize their existence 
and dimensions drove these conflicts underground, where they festered.”29  As 
disillusionment with the political and economic systems of Communism grew, 
                                                 
25
 Preece, Minority Rights, 15. 
 
26
 Stephen Deets, “Re-imagining the Boundaries of the Nation:  Politics and the Development of Ideas on 
Minority Rights,” East European Politics & Societies 20, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 427. 
 
27
 Ibid, 428.  
 
28
 Ibid, 427.  
 
29
 Rothschild and Wingfield, Return to Diversity, 263. 
  13 
nationalism became a popular option to help “bolster legitimacy in all the East European 
States”30 so that by the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s “even communist party 
elites [had] abandoned pretensions of preserving central dominance in favor of local 
national power.”31 
 
- Post-Cold War - 
 With the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union came the realization of 
how very large the “ideational divide between East and West”32 was concerning 
minorities and the issue of minority rights: 
The collapse of communism as well as the socialist federal states took place 
against this background of both rising reliance on nationalism for legitimacy in 
the East and increased support for minorities in the West.33 
 
This so-called ideational divide has made the transfer of West European norms somewhat 
more difficult than what was originally expected by those “post-communist states aiming 
to join European organizations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the 
European Union.”34  In fact, as Michael Johns argues, the main goal of EU membership 
among East Central European states following the collapse of Communism existed in 
direct conflict with the nationalist goals of these states that so recently emerged from 
under foreign control: 
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 Deets, “Re-imagining the Boundaries of the Nation,” 426. 
 
31
 Ibid, 427. 
 
32
 Ibid, 419. 
 
33
 Ibid, 429. 
 
34
 Tesser, “The Geopolitics of Tolerance,” 483. 
  14 
The states of Eastern Europe [had] two important goals that seem[ed] to be in 
conflict with each other.  First, it [was] imperative for the long-term well-being of 
the newly democratic states [to be] accepted into the EU and the other 
organizations of Europe.  Through accession, they [sought] the economic and 
security advantages that membership offer[ed].  The second goal [was] to protect 
their culture.  To ensure the long-term survival of the states’ dominant language, 
culture, and society, it is necessary to enact laws that will protect them.  By their 
nature, laws that protect one culture disadvantage another.  The EU […] made the 
elimination of these laws paramount for accession.  Therefore, [in order] to 
achieve the first goal, the second [had to] be abandoned and vice versa.35 
 
This poses a strong dilemma with regards to EU membership and the adoption of EU (i.e. 
Western European) norms regarding minority rights.  Vachudova explains that “there is 
potential for backlash where certain sensitive ‘national’ policies are at stake [because] on 
these issues, the EU can be portrayed as a threat to the nation and thereby strengthen the 
hand of nationalist parties.”36  This is of special concern regarding those countries that 
developed illiberal regimes after the fall of communism mainly because those 
governments were able to grab onto and maintain power through the auspices of 
nationalism. 
 Why did the issue of ethnic and national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe 
re-emerge with such intensity following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War?  As was mentioned before, as disillusionment with Communist economic 
and political policies grew so did the ethno-national tensions and nationalist tendencies 
that had previously been suppressed by communist rule: 
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 Michael Johns, “‘Do As I Say, Not As I Do’:  The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority 
Rights,” East European Politics & Societies 17, no. 4 (2003):  685. 
 
36
 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 226. 
  15 
The virtual destruction of civil society twinned with the oppression of ethnic 
minority groups during communism compounded the saliency of ethnic identity 
during the transition.  At a time when very few civic organizations existed that 
regrouped citizens across ethnic lines, organizations representing ethnic minority 
groups mobilized quickly to press their claims for cultural and political rights.  
They viewed democratization as a great opportunity to gain power and protect 
their identity after long years of oppression.37 
 
Because of the problems that emerged during the inter-war years regarding ethnic and 
national minority tensions, which inevitably led to the horrors of World War II, it is 
understandable why the issue of minority rights became so important for the European 
community immediately following the collapse of communism.  Also, the break-up of the 
former Yugoslavia and the subsequent Bosnian war, which was the epitome of ethnic 
conflict, further proves that “the ‘problem of minorities’ may have very serious 
consequences not only for the individuals concerned but also for domestic, regional and 
indeed global peace and security.”38  Hence the importance of a strong and clear EU 
minority rights policy. 
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38
 Preece, Minority Rights, 5. 
  
 
 
 
EU Minority Rights Policy – the Successes and the Limitations 
 
 
- Successes - 
 
Even though many concerns existed regarding CEE implementation of minority 
rights policy with regards to its possible affect on strengthening nationalistic parties, the 
overall implementation of this policy by accession states in CEE as required by the 
acquis communautaire as well as the Copenhagen criteria has been relatively successful.  
Vachudova maintains that “the treatment of ethnic minorities in East Central Europe [has 
proven to be] one of the most vivid cases of successful EU conditionality.”39  Because of 
the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria and the necessity to ensure protection of 
minority rights to obtain EU membership, countries like Latvia and Estonia “have now 
adopted citizenship, language, and educational legislation”40 directed towards their 
Russian minorities; Hungary and Slovakia have been directed to address issues like 
discrimination, education, and poverty towards their own minority Roma population; and 
Romania has pursued efforts to improve the educational and cultural restrictions on its 
Hungarian minority.  It is interesting to note that the pressure that the EU placed on the 
illiberal governments of Romania and Slovakia was probably the most intense of all 
considering that the violence going on in the Balkans and the Western Europeans 
                                                 
39
 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 145. 
 
40
 “The EU and minority policy- does enlargement signal the end of influence?” Euractiv.com. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-minority-policy-enlargement-signal-influence/article-110088, 
(accessed March 1, 2008). 
  17 
inability to stop it consequently led “Western governments [to apply] by far the most 
pressure on illiberal pattern governments to improve ethnic tolerance”: 
Eventually they also extracted the most extensive promises in this area - in the 
special clauses attached to the Europe Agreements, in the agreements admitting 
Romania and Slovakia to the Council of Europe, and in the bilateral treaties that 
both the Mečiar and the Iliescu governments eventually signed with Hungary.41 
 
The pressure of EU conditionality with regards to minority rights policy implementation 
can also be seen on countries with less illiberal governments: 
The position of the Roma in the Czech Republic […], and of ethnic Russians in 
the Baltic states […], subsequently improved, because these states were required 
to regularize their treatment of minorities in order to join the European Union.”42 
 
However, while these minorities’ situations did improve, Gallagher also maintains that 
“since minority protection is not covered by the EU’s founding treaty, the monitoring of 
inter-ethnic relations ceased upon accession.”43 
 
- Limitations - 
 The absence of a sufficient EU-wide monitoring system for minority rights is just 
one of the limitations that exist within EU minority rights policy.  In listing these 
weaknesses in EU minority rights policy it is important to keep in mind that the majority 
of these should be examined in the context of their potential harm to EU minority rights 
policy implementation for the future.   Before CEE accession to the EU, these proposed 
limitations (while present) did not really count for much considering that the accession 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe had no choice but to adopt them if they wanted 
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to obtain EU membership.  The point being made, however, is that now that these 
countries have obtained EU membership, now that they have “a choice” so to speak, how 
big of a factor do these limitations play in affecting minority rights policy 
implementation post-enlargement.  Bernd Rechel lists six of these important factors that 
limit the EU’s impact in minority rights implementation in East Central Europe: 
These factors include a lack of minority rights standards within the EU, an 
emphasis on the acquis communautaire, missing expertise on minority issues, the 
superficial monitoring of candidate states, a lack of concern for human rights, and 
a failure of addressing public attitudes towards minorities.44 
 
Because of space constraints I am unable to examine each of these factors individually, 
but I will, however, address a few.  With regards to the lack of minority rights standards, 
Rechel argues that “the Copenhagen criteria did not define […] the process by which EU 
conditionality could be enforced and verified, limiting their potential impact at the 
domestic level.”45  Rechel also maintains that because there exists no clear process of 
enforcement within the Copenhagen criteria then the weight of EU conditionality falls on 
the technical requirements of the acquis which “covers different policy areas to very 
different degrees.”46  In the area of minority rights, for example, there exists no detailed 
coverage regarding implementation and because of this there exists a “‘conditionality 
gap’ where explicit leverage [has been] weak.”47  Rechel further argues that the EU’s 
impact on minority rights in East Central Europe is affected by the lack of genuine 
concern that exists within the EU towards human or minority rights.  With regards to the 
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 Ibid, 179. 
 
47
 Ibid, 180. 
  19 
accession process, minority rights play only a secondary, perfunctory role that stems out 
of concern more for regional stability than for actual minority protections.48 
 Rechel’s argument regarding superficial monitoring of candidate states has 
particular merit especially when considering the suggestion that because of the double 
standards that exist within the EU among old member states and new, old Western 
European member states are not monitored on the same level that the new East Central 
European members are.  With a lack of an EU-wide system of monitoring or 
implementation, the EU depends mostly on the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) for monitoring and 
implementing standards.  This becomes somewhat problematic when considering that 
these organizations themselves have not historically examined the Western countries 
equally with the East.  Take for example the OSCE: 
While some reports are made for the entire region, on general issues such as 
linguistic rights of national minorities, when specific countries are targeted for 
analysis, all 14 of the recommendations have been countries in Eastern Europe.49 
 
Johns argues that the most likely explanation for this lack of recommendations towards 
Western European countries is that the “high commissioner knows that any 
recommendation given to Western countries would be summarily ignored.”50  This lack 
of concern among the old Western EU member states could in the future generate the 
same lack of concern among new Eastern EU member states. 
 Probably one of the most valid arguments to address when discussing 
inaccuracies of EU minority rights is the case of the enduring double-standard: 
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Minority rights protection is, in sum, one of the areas where the asymmetry of 
power between the EU member states and the candidates is most in evidence, 
because here, very clearly, the candidates are being required to meet goals that the 
member states have not set for themselves.51 
 
While the new EU members were required to implement the Copenhagen criteria, which 
sets the requirement for the respect for and protection of minorities, the old member 
states were not.  What’s important to keep in mind is the affect these discrepancies with 
EU norms on minority rights policy will have in the future, because the absence of a 
European-wide system of monitoring coupled with “the fact that the Copenhagen criteria 
do not apply to existing member states are likely to […] undermine post-enlargement 
attempts to continue protecting minorities.”52 
 When examining these facts it is impossible to not acknowledge the importance of 
EU standards regarding the protection of minorities in its own member states as well as 
the leverage the EU holds over possible future members to adopt minority rights policy.  
However, the discrepancies and imperfections that exist within the EU minority rights 
policy as a whole have the potential to weaken the EU’s leverage in the future – whether 
it be with current member states or possible candidate states. 
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National Political Change as a Precondition for Successful EU Policy 
Implementation:  the Case of Hungary 
 
Hungary stands out as a unique example when it comes to the issue of minority 
rights, mainly because it sees the importance of minority rights as a national as well as an 
international issue.  With the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, Hungary was 
forced to secede over 2/3 of its territory as well as 2/3 of its population to its surrounding 
neighbors – “3 million Hungarians suddenly found themselves in the newly formed states 
of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia.”53  On top of this large minority 
population that lives outside Hungarian borders, there also exists a multitude of different 
ethnic and national minorities that live within Hungarian borders and make up around 
10% of the population – these include Roma, Germans, Slovaks, Serbs, etc. just to name 
a few.  Therefore, with regards to the minority question, Hungary sees this issue from two 
different perspectives – “both as a host state for thirteen national and ethnic minorities 
living within the present-day borders of Hungary and as Hungarians themselves, living as 
minorities in a number of neighboring states.”54  Specifically because Hungary has such a 
large diaspora population outside its borders, it maintains a rather positive track record 
with regards to the different minority populations in its own borders.  However, it is 
important to note the role that Hungary’s internal minority populations play in this 
positive track record as well.  While Hungary does serve as the host state for around 13 
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different national and ethnic minorities, these groups are “spread over some 1500 cities, 
towns and villages [and] are, in general, geographically dispersed […] which can make 
the maintenance of identity and group cohesion difficult.”55  Guido Schwellnus goes 
further in detail regarding this minority disbursement and the role it plays in Hungary’s 
specific minority situation: 
Not only the existence of large external minorities, i.e. fellow Hungarians living 
as minorities in neighboring countries […], but also the fact that the external 
minorities are territorially concentrated, while the internal minorities are 
dispersed, well integrated and to a large extent assimilated – this amounts to a 
strong incentive to promote collective rights.56 
 
Therefore, not only does Hungary’s large diaspora living abroad play an important role in 
the implementation of positive national minority rights policy, but it is the domestic 
conditions behind the minority populations within Hungarian borders that facilitate the 
promotion of these collective rights within Hungarian legislation as well.  These two 
factors are the most important to keep in mind when considering how Hungarian national 
policy has smoothed the way for successful EU policy implementation in the area of 
minority rights. 
 
- Historical Context - 
 To understand the issue of minority rights in Hungary today it is essential to 
briefly address Hungary’s history as a nation in the twentieth century.  After losing the 
First World War and signing the Treaty of Trianon, “Hungary went from being one of the 
great powers of Europe and a key element of an empire to a weak state, surrounded by 
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countries where Hungarians lived at risk.”57  The importance of this development in 
Hungarian national history cannot be over-stated.  Before World War I and the break up 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, ethnic Hungarians within the boundaries of the empire 
enjoyed a majority status, with all of the benefits that came with it.  After the war, 
however, 2/3 of the Hungarians “who had belonged to [the] influential majority 
[suddenly] found themselves [living outside their home country as] a minority with low 
status and with no kin state to protect them.”58  Throughout the inter-war years that came 
after World War I and the subsequent Trianon treaty, attitudes and opinions towards 
minority groups in Hungary were somewhat mixed.  While some political groups were 
extremely antagonistic towards the different minorities remaining in Hungary and feared 
“that their autonomous position might lead to further territorial mutilations of the 
country, […] the government used great moderation in their policies [towards 
minorities].”59  The reasons for this are similar to the reasons behind positive Hungarian 
minority rights policy today: 
It was felt by the government that any hostile activity would trigger a very similar 
response against the Hungarians living beyond the border, where forceful 
assimilation undoubtedly would have been introduced on a reciprocity basis.  The 
government also did not wish to alienate the majority populations in the 
neighboring countries but wished to impress them with its nationality policy.60 
 
Whatever the reasons may have been, this position didn’t last long.  As economic decline 
set in and the hopes associated with market capitalism and liberal democracy began to 
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wither away, “the financial despair combined with resentment about the war produced the 
rise of right-wing parties promising order and restoration.”61  As the European continent 
was swept into World War II, Hungary saw the opportunity to gain back what it had so 
grievously lost after the Great War two decades earlier, and in its irredentist pursuits 
aligned itself with Nazi Germany.  While initially Hungary profited greatly from this 
relationship – regaining most of its lost territory from countries like Czechoslovakia, 
Serbia, and the area of Transylvania in Romania – “these gains were only temporary and 
defeat on the battlefield led to the status quo ante.”62  The situation for Hungary after this 
loss was somewhat different from that of its loss in World War I – “once again, Hungary 
lost historic lands, but this time, Hungarians in these areas were targeted for retribution 
for the crimes, real and alleged, of Hungary during the wartime occupation.”63 
 While discrimination against ethnic Hungarians living outside of their home state 
abounded during the Cold War years – particularly in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia – it 
was a relatively dormant issue in Hungarian politics throughout this time period.  The 
main reason for this being that in the effort to unite all citizens under the banner of 
communism and smother any hint of resistance to its political, social, and economic rule, 
communist leaders refused to acknowledge or legitimize the existence of ethnic conflict 
or division: 
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During the Cold War, the communist regime did not and could not pay much 
attention to the plight of Hungarians outside of Hungary.  The focus of the regime 
and of the populations was on events at home, including the 1956 revolt and the 
increased repression that followed.  Thus, the issue of Hungarians abroad was 
largely dormant until the end of the regime, when it became one of the […] most 
important foreign-policy priorities of the new democratic governments.64 
 
With the legacy of Trianon still so fresh on the hearts and minds of Hungarian citizens, 
the discrimination against Hungarians abroad during the Cold War, and the increasing 
concern regarding the fact that in the immediate years following the disintegration of 
communism “most of the Hungarians abroad were in states making difficult transitions 
from communism,”65 it is easy to see why the question of minority rights as a foreign 
policy issue as well as a national policy issue became so important to the democratic 
Hungary that emerged from the remnants of communism and the Cold War.   
 
- National Policy Development:  Facilitator for EU Minority Rights Policy Adoption -  
Compared with the other states of Central and Eastern Europe “Hungary has gone 
much further in the codification of collective minority rights than any other country in the 
region.”66  From the late 1980s onward Hungary has worked to implement policies at the 
national level to instill protections for its minority populations.  Below is a broad timeline 
of some of these policies: 
- December 1988 and January 1989:  introduction of legislation establishing the 
rights of association and assembly 
- October 1989:  Constitutional amendment gave minorities the right to their 
own culture, religion, and the use of their mother tongue 
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- 1990:  Article 68 added to the Constitution stating (1) that minorities living 
within the Republic of Hungary represented a “constituent part of the State; 
(2) that political representation of minorities was to be ensured; (3) that 
minorities had the “right to form local and national bodies for self-
government; (4) established the introduction of a Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Rights of Ethnic and National Minorities (i.e. Minority Ombudsman) 
- July 1993:  Act LXXVII on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities 
(“Minorities Act”) introduced as a comprehensive legislation regulating the 
cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities in Hungary67 
 
Again, what is so fascinating about these policies is that they were implemented not only 
to focus on internal minorities, but they were also created and adopted as a part of 
explicit foreign policy goals:  
On the question of minority accommodation in Hungary, [it is] explicitly [linked] 
to a specific foreign policy concern.  Hungary wanted to secure regional stability 
and peace, so it decided not to pursue border changes.  But still it wanted to be 
able to protect the Magyar minorities in the neighboring countries.  A strong 
endorsement of minority rights therefore served as a moral justification for its 
stance towards the Magyar minorities in neighboring Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine 
and Yugoslavia, whose fate it wanted to influence positively.68 
 
So important is this implementation of Hungarian minority rights legislation as a 
component of foreign policy that a prevision to this goal was included in the ‘Minorities 
Act’ of 1993:   
With the intention of promoting friendly co-operation and understanding between 
peoples and nations; and, conscious of the fact that the peaceful co-existence of 
national and ethnic minorities with the nation in majority is a component of 
international security.69 
 
As has been previously mentioned, the significance of this ‘foreign policy’ element plays 
a crucial role in the successful development of Hungarian national policy with regards to 
minority rights (domestic conditions regarding the specific minority groups within 
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Hungary play an important role as well).  In turn, the establishment of a cohesive and 
proactive minority rights regime in Hungary’s national legislation allowed for a smooth 
and successful implementation of EU minority rights policy, thereby pushing Hungary 
one step further down the path to EU membership. 
 While overall there was relative ease in implementing EU minority rights policy 
into Hungarian national policy considering that “the minority protection system, 
guaranteed by the constitution and specified in the Minority Act of 1993, was well 
developed before the minority criterion in the EU accession acquis was formulated,”70 it 
must be mentioned that a few obstacles on the road to EU membership with regards to the 
issue of minorities still existed.  Two of the main problems were the adoption of the 
Hungarian Status Law in June 2001 and the stagnant and disadvantaged situation of the 
Roma minority population within Hungary.  In order to fix these problems the 
government was forced to implement crucial changes to the Status Law, the original 
version of which neighboring countries believed violated “their sovereignty [by giving] 
Hungary a formal responsibility in their internal affairs,” and the EU Venice Commission 
deemed “portions of [it] to be in violation of EU standards regarding discrimination.”71  
With regards to the Roma population detailed “resolutions were adopted specifically 
aimed at ameliorating the situation of the Roma” in addition to the minority rights 
legislation that had already been passed which “became regarded as insufficient for the 
Roma,” whose impoverished position within the population was seen not just as an ethnic 
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issue, but a social one as well.72  This issue with the Roma population in some ways calls 
into question existence of a “genuine support for the domestic implementation of 
[minority rights policy],” at least, that is, as it pertains to the Roma minority.73  To 
address this problem in the future Hungary needs to further evolve its already proactive 
minority legislation to increasingly incorporate the Roma minority in addition to the 
current strategy of adopting separate legislation that is aimed specifically at the Roma. 
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EU Policy Implementation as a Precondition for National Policy Change:  the Case 
of Latvia 
 
The evolution of national minority rights policy in post-Soviet Latvian politics 
folds out somewhat differently than that of Hungary.  Unlike Hungary, national policies 
implemented in Latvia in the early 1990s actually impeded the implementation of EU 
minority rights policy instead of facilitating it as in Hungary’s case.  Latvia’s emergence 
as an independent nation is relatively recent and its experience is equally as limited – the 
nation didn't emerge as an independent state of its own until 1918 and soon thereafter 
during World War II was forced to assimilate into the Soviet Union “not […] as a 
satellite state, but as [a] fully subservient Soviet republic.”74  Considering this it is easy to 
understand how Latvia’s road towards European integration “has been significantly 
affected by the legacies of its Soviet past – [mainly the legacy of its] considerable 
minority communities.”75  Immediately following the collapse of communism and the 
restoration of Latvian independence and democratic institutions the country embarked on 
what some scholars have called a pursuit of ethnic democracy rather than liberal 
democracy.  In pursuing this so-called ‘ethnic democracy’, controversial legislation 
passed in the 1990s in areas like citizenship, language, and education “placed the state 
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firmly in the hands of the titular population, while politically alienating the largely 
Russian-speaking minority community.”76 
While the country’s unstable past played a major role in Latvia’s pursuit of 
nationalistic policies following the collapse of communism, conversely it was this same 
past that created Latvia’s overwhelming desire to “rejoin” Europe by actively seeking 
membership in the prominent European international institutions like NATO and the 
European Union: 
Their mere inclusion in the most extensive and cohesive political formation ever 
created in Europe offers a much greater prospect for stable development and 
lasting independence than at any time in their modern history.  [With 
membership, Latvians now have the] the opportunity to regain their lost years and 
take part in the [larger future of the Union]. 
 
Furthermore, European integration in this sense was seen by “Latvian politicians and 
much of the titular populace […] as the ultimate security guarantee.”77  On top of this, 
“integration [was] viewed as essential for maintaining national sovereignty,”78 and the 
economic benefits associated with European Union membership obviously played a 
significant role as well. 
 In order to obtain this membership goal, however, Latvia had to make severe 
changes in the nationalist policies that were implemented following the collapse of 
communism and were seen by the EU and other organizations like the OSCE and CoE as 
discriminatory against the Russian-speaking minorities.  I will briefly focus on one piece 
of legislation in particular as an example of nationalist policies – the citizenship law – to 
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examine why it was deemed discriminatory, what changes were made to satisfy EU 
requirements, and the reasons behind why Latvia chose to make the changes that go 
beyond the country’s basic aspirations for membership. 
 
- Historical Context - 
 Latvia’s history as a nation is fundamentally and inextricably linked with its 
Soviet past.  In no area of the social, economic, or political system is this truer than the 
area of minority rights.  Soviet population policies during the Cold War caused major 
demographic shifts, with the number of Russian-speaking minorities within the country 
growing from around 33% to 48% by the end of the 1980s.79  So significant was this 
growth that “according to the 1989 census, […] Latvians had become a minority in the 
eight largest cities.”80  This large demographic shift also had significant effects on 
language within the country as well – in the major cities the dominant language was 
Russian and throughout all of Latvia, statistics show that while around 60 percent of 
Latvians knew Russian, only 18 percent respectively of non-Latvians knew the Latvian 
language.81  With regards to Soviet domination and migration of Russian-speaking 
peoples to the country, by the end of the Cold War it became painfully obvious that it was 
the Latvians who “had accommodated to the needs of the Russians, rather than vise 
versa.”82 
                                                 
79
 David Galbreath, “The Politics of European Integration and Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia,” 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 4, no. 1 (2003): 37. 
 
80
 Judith Green Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe:  the Power of Norms & Incentives (Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 2004):  73. 
 
81
 Ibid, 73. 
 
82
 Ibid, 73. 
  31 
With independence and the restoration of Latvia’s 1922 constitution along with its 
interwar pre-Soviet democratic institutions came huge issues concerning citizenship, 
language, employment, etc.  These initial policies that were implemented in response to 
the aforementioned issues mainly served to exacerbate tensions between the Latvian 
majority and the Russian-speaking minority, and throughout the 1990s the laws were 
subjected to detailed scrutiny and criticism from the European international organizations 
that Latvia aspired to join.  This criticism in turn resulted in extensive policy changes 
required by the European institutions that contradicted Latvia’s initial pursuance of a 
stringent ethnic policy. 
 
- National Policy Development:  Impediment to EU Minority Rights Policy Adoption - 
 While there are a number of policy issues that existed in Latvia concerning the 
issue of minority rights (some of these include controversial election laws, education 
laws, and language laws that were passed throughout the 1990s and were found to 
severely discriminate – either directly or indirectly – the Russian-speaking minority), the 
citizenship law has by far been the most controversial.83  In October of 1991 Latvia’s 
supreme council issued an exceptionally strict resolution on citizenship which restored 
“citizenship only to those who were citizens of Latvia before 1940, and their descendants, 
leaving about seven-hundred thousand inhabitants without Latvian citizenship.”84  The 
conditions for those seeking citizenship were equally as strict requiring knowledge of the 
Latvian language, knowledge of the Latvian political and legal system, residency status 
of at least sixteen years, an oath of allegiance to Latvia, and renunciation of another state 
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citizenship if applicable.  This draft citizenship law created much concern among the 
European institutions.  The main concern, according to the OSCE’s High Commissioner 
on National Minorities, was “the state of the draft citizenship law [and the fact that] an 
overly conservative citizenship law [did] not bode well for Latvia’s democratic 
transition.”85  Recommendations to amend the law came from both the OSCE and the 
CoE and included an amendment to Article 9 which mandated quotas, “to instead set 
forth a system of naturalization giving priority to certain categories of non-citizens and 
eventually opening up naturalization to everyone within a few years.”86  While other 
amendment recommendations were given, advocating limiting residency requirements to 
just five years, addressing the issue of stateless children, and easing the language 
requirements, it was this issue of quotas that remained the most crucial.  So important 
was the removal of this provision that the CoE stipulated to the Latvian parliament if it 
“did not change the quota system in the law on citizenship, then the door to [Council of 
Europe membership] would be closed.”87  Even with their CoE membership on the line, 
the parliament went ahead with the original bill and approved the citizenship law, without 
removing the quotas condition, in June 1994. 
 The law instigated much international criticism from the OSCE and CoE as well 
as other European countries and institutions, but it wasn’t until the EU voiced its 
criticisms of the law and fully backed the OSCE and CoE’s positions that Latvia finally 
responded.  In backing the OSCE and CoE, the EU made it very clear to Latvia that if it 
                                                 
85
 Galbreath, “European Integration through Democratic Conditionality:  Latvia in the Context of Minority 
Rights,” 78-79. 
 
86
 Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe:  the Power of Norms and Incentives, 86. 
 
87
 Ibid, 87. 
  33 
could not gain membership into these institutions then further integration in the Union 
would be endangered as well.88  To avoid jeopardizing their future membership, Latvia’s 
president “returned the law to the parliament with a request for revisions to meet the 
standards of the OSCE and CoE.”89  An amended law was approved in late July 1994 
with amendments that replaced the quota system with a “window system” that was 
suggested by the European institutions and “would allow different categories to apply for 
citizenship, with all who wished to do so to apply by 1998.”90  Even though the 
nationalists in parliament were able to restrain most of the changes to the law (most of the 
other recommendations from the OSCE and CoE were ignored), “international praise 
abounded because the main concern, the quotas, was gone.”91 
 The institutions’ satisfaction, however, didn’t last for long and over the next few 
years they continued to monitor Latvia and submit recommendations on reforming the 
citizenship law.  They were mainly dissatisfied with the slow rate of naturalization as 
well as the fact that the issue of stateless children still had not been resolved.  The 
nationalist government, however, “responded only to minor parts of [these] 
recommendations, [maintained] a strict nationalist stand on the citizenship issue, and had 
publicly committed to no further facilitation of naturalization.”92  The harder the 
European institutions pushed the more the nationalist parties of the Latvian government 
resisted against reforming the law.  It was not until the EU made citizenship law reform a 
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“‘key criterion’ for beginning EU entry talks” that the parliament finally adopted the 
required amendments in late June 1998 abolishing “the window system and [giving] 
citizenship to stateless children without a language exam.”93  Domestic opposition 
remained strong among the nationalist parties, however, and a referendum on the changes 
was held in October, but was defeated with 53 percent voting for the amendments.  After 
such resistance from the Latvian nationalist parties to change any part of the citizenship 
law, “the success of the [1998] amendment [and] referendum marked a major turning 
point in relation to [Latvia’s] future European integration.”94 
 The example of Latvia’s citizenship law marks just one instance of how Latvian 
nationalist policies impeded the implementation EU policy regarding minorities.  In this 
instance, it was the influence and pressure from the prominent European institutions, 
including the EU that shaped the Latvia’s domestic policies to be more favorable to their 
Russian-speaking minorities.  Other areas that presented major problems and setbacks for 
Latvia in the area of minorities included education, language, legal, and employment 
rights just to name a few.  Language rights (specifically the right to a bilingual education 
system taught in both Russian and Latvian) were especially important considering that 
the percentage of the minority population that actually knew Latvian was extremely 
small.  However, in these areas just as with the citizenship law, the Latvian government 
usually yielded to pressure from the larger European institutions and made the requisite 
amendments to the legislation in accordance with recommendations and “overall, 
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European organizations were able to persuade Baltic governments to liberalize their 
social policies, although it took some time.”95 
 While Latvia still has a long way to go with regards to its policies that negatively 
affect minorities, the general consensus among scholars is that the country has made great 
strides in reforming and amending it nationalistic policies.  In a recent statement from 
Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, he maintains that 
while “the issues of naturalization and education reform remain widely debated in the 
society at large, [he] noted a significant improvement in the socio-economic situation 
[and in] inter-ethnic relations in the country” as compared with previous reports.96  
Although education reform remains an on-going process and the rate of naturalization 
remains slow – only about 6,000 to 7,000 people a year – the important point to keep in 
mind is Latvia’s adaptation to ideals of the EU concerning the minorities.  Considering 
that the “government is [currently] trying hard to promote an inclusive and non-
discriminatory policy towards its minorities,”97 which does focus on issues concerning 
the pursuance of education reform and the establishment of a bilingual education system, 
this should exemplify how the EU and its requirements on minority rights policy 
implementation inspired Latvia’s attitude towards this policy area from passive to active.  
While initially Latvia only included minority rights policy within its own national 
legislation in response to EU pressures, today the country actively pursues the 
development of its own national minority rights policy. 
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Conclusion 
 
One of the most important matters for post-socialist Europe has been the 
management of majority-minority relationships.  As democratization is as much 
about redefining the nation as the character of governance, the protection of 
minorities has been an important issue of conflict prevention.98 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, the question of minority rights in Central and 
Eastern Europe as an issue of toleration and conflict prevention became one of extreme 
importance.  For the countries of this region, because most of them overwhelmingly 
aimed for European integration to solidify their statuses as liberal democracies, it was 
absolutely necessary that these countries reconcile Western European norms regarding 
minority rights with their own domestic policies and standards.  For the pan-European 
institutions and the countries of Western Europe (who belonged to the EU), because of 
the problems that emerged during the interwar years regarding ethnic and national 
minority tensions (which inevitably led to the horrors of World War II) and the break out 
of violent ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia immediately following the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, it is understandable why the issue of minority rights became so 
important for the European community immediately following the collapse of 
communism.  Hence the importance of developing a ‘europeanized’ minority rights 
policy. 
 This paper has examined this so-called ‘europeanization’ of minority rights by 
specifically looking at its implementation in two countries where the “minority” 
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situations differ greatly – Hungary and Latvia.  While obviously the national attitudes and 
policies regarding minorities are different in each state, they are still subject to the same 
scrutiny and policies and at the EU level.  With both cases I have examined how national 
domestic policy affected the rate and ease of EU minority rights policy adoption into the 
national legislation.  In Hungary’s case, because of its large Hungarian diaspora 
population and the foreign policy aspect of this political area, it has developed a 
remarkably proactive record with regards to minority rights protections.  This has 
obviously facilitated the implementation of EU minority rights policy into national 
legislation.  Latvia’s experience with the EU and the adherence to EU norms regarding 
minority rights has been somewhat more problematic to say the least.  The country’s 
pursuit of nationalistic policies that severely hindered and impeded the social 
development of the large Russian-speaking minority hampered the adoption process of 
EU minority rights policy there.  In this case, contrary to Hungary, it was the 
implementation of this ‘europeanized’ minority rights policy that acted as a precondition 
for domestic political change in Latvia.   
While many scholars have ruled the adoption of EU minority rights policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe generally as a success, many imperfections and 
inconsistencies still exist within the ideals behind Western European minority rights 
policy today and it is important to address these limitations when looking towards the 
future.  Some of these imperfections include an overall lack of minority rights standards 
within the EU, superficial monitoring of candidate states, the fact that more concern 
exists for regional stability rather than for actual minority protections, along with the fact 
that double standards exist considering that while CEE states were required to adopt 
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minority rights policy, Western European states were not, etc.99  It is impossible to not 
acknowledge the importance of EU standards regarding the protection of minorities in its 
own member states as well as the leverage the EU holds over possible future members to 
adopt minority rights policy.  What is important to keep in mind, however, is the 
possibility that these discrepancies and imperfections that do exist have the potential to 
weaken the EU’s leverage in the future with current member states, possible candidate 
states, or both.  Also important to keep in mind is the future role that minorities 
themselves will play in this ‘europeanized’ minority rights system.  Consider the 
plausible possibility that “minority groups [could] increasingly [begin to] view the EU as 
their new ‘host-state,’ and [could try to] pressure the EU to enforce a broader and more 
uniform application of minority rights than has been previously possible.”100  How would 
this development affect the impact of the EU in this policy area – particularly how would 
it affect the impact of the EU in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe?  Could this 
be seen as a way for the EU to increase its leverage on this issue – especially when 
considering the popular belief that “the Commission [no longer has the] power to 
influence minority policies post-accession”?101  Or would increased pressure on the EU 
from minorities to act as a ‘host-state’ further weaken the EU’s influence on this issue?  
These are all important questions to keep in mind when considering the future of minority 
rights policy on both the national and European level. 
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